Northern Illinois University Law Review
Volume 29

Issue 2

Article 6

5-1-2009

Torture and Habeas Corpus as Information-Forcing Devices
Marc D. Falkoff

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr
Part of the Law Commons

Suggested Citation
Marc D. Falkoff, Torture and Habeas Corpus as Information-Forcing Devices, 29 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 425
(2009).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Huskie Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Northern Illinois University Law Review by an authorized editor of Huskie Commons. For
more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

+(,121/,1(
Citation: 29 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 425 2008-2009

Content downloaded/printed from
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Tue Jul 5 16:13:59 2016
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from
uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
of your HeinOnline license, please use:
https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?
&operation=go&searchType=0
&lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0734-1490

Torture and Habeas Corpus as InformationForcing Devices*
MARC D. FALKOFF**

I appreciate this opportunity to speak with you, as a lawyer and former
member of the Modem Language Association, about torture and interrogation. My remarks tonight are shaped by my experience representing sixteen
Yemeni prisoners, all of whom have been held at Guantdnamo for nearly
seven years without charge, trial, or even a court hearing about the legality
of their detention. They have all been abused, and some have been tortured
(by any definition of the term). My thoughts about the topic, in short, are
based on experience and not just theory.
Let me start, then, by saying just a word about my clients. Most have
been interrogated hundreds of times. The "ordinary" techniques to which
they have been subjected during interrogation have included beatings, questioning at gun point, sexual humiliation, sleep deprivation, forced grooming, exposure to extremes of heat and cold, and prolonged solitary confinement which has stretched, in some instances, for years. In addition, between
January 2002 (when Guantnamo opened for business as a War on Terror
interrogation center) and the fall of 2004 (when the courts ordered the military to allow me and a small group of lawyers to visit our clients for the
first time), all of these abuses took place in secret. Even today, no journalist
has ever interviewed a single prisoner while at Guantdnamo. The stress has
been unbearable for some of my clients, including one who has attempted
suicide multiple times-once by biting off and swallowing a six-inch length
of the naso-gastric tube that the military uses to force-feed him twice a day.
Another time this same client tried to hang himself in his cell-an incident
the military dismissed as a "hanging gesture," rather than a suicide attempt.
In a similar Orwellian vein, suicide attempts are generally described by the
military as acts of "manipulative self-injurious behavior."1
So-called "high-value detainees" have been subjected to worse at secret CIA "black sites," whose location remains a secret. The "enhanced
techniques" to which they were subjected include, as everyone now knows,
* Text of a talk delivered for the 'Torture and Interrogation" panel at the Modem
Language Association's annual convention on December 27, 2008.
**
Assistant Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law. J.D., Columbia Law School; Ph.D., Brandeis University; M.A., University of Michigan-Ann Arbor;
B.A., University of Pennsylvania. Many thanks to Aaron Galloway for his able research
assistance and to the other panel members for their interesting and provocative papers.
1. See David Rose, Guantdnamo Bay on Trial, VANTrY FAIR, Jan. 2004, at 88.
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waterboarding-which is often misdescribed in the press as a technique that
gives the victim a "sensation" of drowning, when in fact it is controlled,
actual drowning. One of my clients was kept in total darkness for weeks
before being transferred to Guantinamo; he was subjected to blaring music
in what is commonly known as the "Dark Prison" at Bagram, with the
darkness and noise interrupted only by an occasional interrogation session
which took place in a red-lit room. At times, this man was hanged by chains
from a wall with his feet barely touching the ground. Another of my clients
was rendered to Jordan where he was repeatedly beaten on the soles of his
feet with some type of bamboo pole.
So yes, having litigated in federal court to stop torture, I do have some
thoughts on the topic.
But I want to talk about something more than my clients' plight tonight. The title of my remarks is Torture and Habeas Corpus as Information-ForcingDevices. My purpose is to talk briefly about the "real" motives
for torture and why it is important for us to determine what they are. All of
you are familiar with the cultural theorists who have written about torture
over the years, and I am sure you will agree that academics like Michel
Foucault and Elaine Scarry have been inventive, moving, and insightful
about what actually motivates states to inflict pain on their prisoners. We2
have come to think about torture as a spectacle or performance or theater,
to understand it as an instance of sacred violence that pulls our community
together in some manner, 3 and to recognize that its emergence in contemporary society proves the principle that "sovereignty names the power which
withdraws and suspends the law."4 Of course, the states that torture tend to
offer a simpler and more straightforward reason for their deployment of
such tactics: to gather information from hardened criminals in order to keep
the public safe. This official explanation, however, is routinely dismissed
by those of us looking for a deeper understanding of the cultural work being
done by state-sanctioned torture.
My suggestion here is that we should pause before dismissing the
states' information-gathering rationale for torture as pretextual. The Bush
administration's Guantinamo experiment (along with its abusive detention
policy more broadly) is a case in point. I do believe, to some limited degree,
that our new torture regime may be explained in part as spectacle and in
2.

See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON, chs.

1-2 (Alan Sheridan trans., 2d vintage bks. ed., Random House 1995) (1977).
3.
See PAUL KAHN, SACRED VIOLENCE: TORTURE, TERROR, AND SOVEREIGNTY 7981 (2008) (suggesting that the "ticking time bomb" hypothetical used to justify torture appeals to us in particular as a "political community" of "citizens"); see also ROBERT HAMERTON-KELLY, SACRED VIOLENCE: PAUL'S HERMENEUTIC OF THE CROSS (1992).
4.

JUDITH BUTLER, PRECARIOUS LIFE: THE POWERS OF MOURNING AND VIOLENCE

60 (2004) (discussing the writings of Giorgio Agamben)
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part as an effort to bond together a political community. Nonetheless, academic theorizing does not capture for me a central and obvious political fact
about what has led to our post-9/11 embrace of torture and coercive interrogation methods-that the administration's information-gathering explanation for its behavior was offered in good faith by administration officials
and that it has been rather successful from a public relations point of view.
Academics discount the importance of informationgathering as a true
motive for torture in the modem state. The deeply ingrained prejudice starts-and for my purposes here, ends-with Elaine Scarry and her tour-deforce description of the dehumanizing effects of torture, The Body in Pain.5
Scarry provides an overwhelming case against torture, painting a compelling portrait of the torture victim and showing how his very humanity
shrinks as he suffers the pain inflicted upon him by the state. Indeed, Scarry
suggests that the torture victim's language itself is "deconstructed" (not, she
explains carefully, just "destroyed") by the torturer.6
Rereading Scarry now, as a lawyer with clients who have been tortured, I am struck by many things, including the array of torture techniques
that she describes and that have been passed down through history and that
I recognize as having been suffered by my clients (including, for example,
forced standing and sleep deprivation). 7 I also find compelling her definition of torture as the sum of pain and questioning-an equation that, interestingly, allows Scarry to argue that the torturer asks his questions in order
to deconstruct the voice and dismantle the humanity of the torture victim.
"Nowhere," Scarry writes, "does language come so close to being the concrete agent of physical pain as here where it not only occurs in such close
proximity to the raising of the rod."'
As I said, Scarry's polemic against torture is utterly convincing, and I
willingly follow when she tells us that the torturer can continue to torture
only if he blunts his sympathy and refuses to acknowledge to himself that
he is meting out pain to a human being, thereby deconstructing the victim's
voice and humanity. I also am sympathetic to the flip side of her argument:
if torture takes away the victim's humanity by deconstructing his voice,
then efforts to make the victim's voice heard will, in a real sense, help to
reconstruct the humanity of the torture victim, resulting in "a partial reversal of the process of torture itself." 9 I thoroughly enjoy reading passages
5.
ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE
WORLD (1985).

6.
7.

Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 47. For a discussion of the Bush administration's "reverse engineering" of

such Cold War torture techniques, see MICHAEL OTrERMAN, AMERICAN TORTURE: FROM THE
COLD WAR TO ABU GHRAIB AND BEYOND (2007).

8.

SCARRY, supra note 5, at 46.

9.

Id. at 50.
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like this, particularly since this reconstructive process was precisely my
motive in publishing10 a volume of poems written by prisoners inside the
wire at Guantinamo.
But Scarry's elegant thesis comes at a cost. Her focus is on the victim
of torture, and she spends relatively little time discussing the motives of the
torturer.She takes it as a given that the torturer-in her book, usually, but
not always, the "regime" rather than the actual person inflicting the paindeploys torture in order to undergird its fiction of power. Scarry rarely
gives actual examples of the professed motivations of the torturing regimes,
though she does occasionally reference Nazi Germany, i" leaving it to the
reader to just "get" that whatever justifications these regimes may have had
for torture, they cannot be legitimate. The implicit argument-a logical
fallacy which I think is a "negative pregnant" -is that if the Nazi's torture,
then torture cannot be justified by any regime.
Now, I am not a fan of torture, obviously. And I hesitate for obvious
reasons to accept any rationale for torture, since I have seen the effects of
my government's torture policy on my clients, who are (believe it or not)
innocent men. But there is a motive for torture that we must take seriously,
at least because our fellow citizens take it seriously: that torture is necessary
to gather information, particularly information that may stop an imminent
disaster. I am speaking, of course, of the "ticking time bomb" justification
for torture.
Professor Scarry refuses to engage with such arguments, claiming repeatedly that any argument that torture is necessary to gather information
must necessarily be flatly false. Scarry asserts, for example, that it is a2
"misdescription" to describe torture as a "form of information-gathering,"
that the purpose of torture "is not to elicit needed information but visibly to
deconstruct the prisoner's voice, '1 3 and that information gathering "masquerades as the motive for torture" and "is a fiction."'14 So, questions are
asked by the torturer "as though they motivated the cruelty" and "as if the
answers16to them were critical"1 5 and are put forward with "feigned ur'
gency."

10.
See POEMS FROM GUANTANAMO: THE DETAINEES SPEAK (Marc Falkoff ed.,
2007); Marc D. Falkoff, Conspiracy to Commit Poetry: Empathetic Lawyering at

GuantdnamoBay, 6 SEATILE J. FOR Soc. JUST. 3 (2007).
11.
ScARRY, supra note 5, at 58.
12.
Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
13.
Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
14.
Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
15.
Id. at 28-29.
16.
ld. at 29. Scarry does, however, concede in a footnote that "there is, of course,
no way to demonstrate conclusively that the need for information is a fictitious motive for
the interrogation." ScARRY, supra note 5, at 329 n.7.
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Scarry suggests that even to ask the question whether torture is justified is to begin to be complicit in the torture itself. "It is difficult to think of
a human situation," she writes,
in which the lines of moral responsibility are more starkly
or simply drawn, in where there is a more compelling reason to ally one's sympathies with the one person and to repel the claims of the other. Yet as soon as the focus of attention shifts to the verbal aspects of torture, those lines
have begun to waiver and change their shape in the
direc17
torturers.
the
crediting
and
accommodating
of
tion
Maybe so. But Scarry's dismissal of information gathering as a legitimate or true motive for torture argues away the one justification for torture
that, in our modern society and especially after 9/11, resonates not only
with our fellow citizens generally, but also with liberals in particular. Thus,
whether the information-gathering rationale is offered in good faith or not,
it is persuasive and must be dealt with.
David Luban, a scholar of law and philosophy, has recently written
about why liberals have difficulty rebutting arguments meant to justify torture in the abstract. He provides a nice catalog of five reasons that regimes
torture, four of which account for the liberal revulsion to prisoner abuse that
we would expect. I will note them quickly. First, torture may be used to
terrorize a population into submission (along the lines of the "spectacle"
that we associate with Foucault's opening chapter in Discipline and Punish); second, as a form of criminal punishment (presumably made unconstitutional by the Eighth Amendment); third, to extract confessions (a historically contingent fact that arose as a perverse consequence to premodern
legal rules requiring either two eyewitnesses or a confession for a convic18
tion for most crimes); and fourth, simply, to lord it over a vanquished foe.
Liberal revulsion can be explained by the fact that each of these reasons for
torture makes the victim "in every respect the opposite" of the liberal vision
of a manisolated and reduced instead of engaged and enlarged, terrified instead of active, humiliated instead of dignified. And,
in the paradigm case of torture, the victor's torment of defeated captives, liberals perceive the living embodiment of
their worst nightmare-tyrannical rulers who take their

17.
18.

SCARRY, supra note 5, at 35.

David Luban, Liberalism, Torture and the Ticking Time Bomb, in THE TORTURE

DEBATE IN AMERICA 35, 40-42 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2005).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 29

pleasure from the degradation of those unfortunate enough
to be subject to their will.' 9
Liberals hate torture, in short, because torture is "tyranny in microcosm, ...
a veritable catalog of the evils of absolutist government. 2 °
Luban goes on, however, to identify the problem that liberals face
when trying to make a principled argument against torture. A fifth rationale
that apologists for torture regimes offer is that "enhanced interrogation
techniques" are necessary to gather information about imminent attacks that
might kills hundreds, thousands, or perhaps tens of thousands. He is referring, of course, to the "ticking time bomb" scenario. Although Luban suggests it is probably the "least common motivation" for torture in real life, he
likewise notes that it provides an argument for torture that is difficult for
liberals to reject, since the evils of torture on this model can be seen as forestalling even greater evils, on a utilitarian calculus. The information-forcing
rationale transforms and rationalizes the motive for torture and acts, in
Luban's words, as a "last resort" for people profoundly reluctant to torture-thus providing what he calls the "liberal ideology of torture. 21
It is of course true, as we all see immediately, that the ticking time
bomb story is highly stylized and artificial. The sole purpose of the torture
in the hypothetical is to collect information to prevent a catastrophe; torture
is presented in the hypothetical as an exception to normal state action and
not the rule, so that it does not raise the specter of state tyranny; and the
torturer, like Jack Bauer when he is not in one of his depressive funks, is
motivated solely by preventing the looming catastrophe, with no sullying
hint of cruelty in his actions. All of this is crystallized in the "ticking time
bomb" scenario, whose purpose is to persuade liberals to concede a single
situation where even he would torture and, having obtained this concession,
prove that he really does not have a principled stand against torture. As
Luban says, once you accept that torture is okay in this situation, "all that is
left is haggling about the price. 22
I will concede that even I am a victim of this highly stylized story. I
can state forthrightly that if I had someone strapped into a chair and I knew
for certain that he had the key to dismantling a nuclear bomb that was set to
go off in Times Square in two hours and that he would not talk unless I
twisted a knife into his knee ... then sure, I would do it. I am, therefore,
willing to admit that my opposition to torture is not categorical and that it
may in a sense be unprincipled.

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 40.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Id. at44.
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It is easy, of course, to get seduced by simplistic examples that misrepresent the world we actually live in and by cheating around the difficulties
of real life. How do we know that our suspect has the keys to the bomb?
How do we know that torturing him will provide us with accurate information? Are we really sure that we have the right person? How sure do we
have to be? Ninety percent? Seventy-five? Fifty?
In the real world, there is no pure safety; we live with risk, and our
goal can only be to comprehend the true nature and likelihood of the risks
and then seek to lower them. That means the best response to the "ticking
time bomb" hypothetical is not to ignore it; indeed, the hypothetical is persuasive only because it is artificial and divorced from any empirical evidence. The hypothetical must be countered with information so that the
public may make a reasoned judgment about the real-life likelihood that
torture will ever prevent a ticking time bomb from exploding. In other
words, we must gather information ourselves about whether our torture
regime is working in the way that our political leaders claim that it is and
whether it is truly reducing risks to our security. The right strategy is not to
deny that abusive interrogations are necessary in order to gather intelligence, to dismiss the very notion that coercion is a regrettable but necessary
tool to protect our national security, or to assert that the proffered need for
gathering intelligence is always a "false" motive put forth by a torture regime.2 3 Rather, the best strategy is to demonstrate to the public that we have
in fact abused, coerced, and tortured prisoners who were innocent of all
wrong-doing 24 and that the information we have gathered from coercive
interrogations has turned out to be just as untrustworthy as experts have
warned.25
23.
Some academics have adopted this position. Talal Asad, for example, has written that torture "is to be understood as a means used strategically for the maintenance of the
nation-state's interests. Like warfare." TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR:
CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY 115 (2003).

24.
The case of Maher Arar's rendition is perhaps the most striking example. Arar,
a Canadian citizen, was arrested in September 2002 by U.S. law enforcement at JFK Airport
in New York on his way home from a Mediterranean vacation. He had earlier been identified
by Canadian authorities as a terrorism suspect. A Canadian government commission of
inquiry determined that Aar was flown by the United States to Jordan and then to Syria,
where he was tortured. In September 2006, the commission issued a report exonerating Arar
of any links to terrorism, and the Canadian government offered him a settlement in excess of
ten million dollars. See COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN
RELATION TO MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR (2006),

availableat http://www.pch.gc.ca/cs-kc/arar/indexe.htm.
25.
It may be plausibly argued, for example, that our prosecution of the Iraq War
was in part a result of the administration relying on false information about a connection
between Iraq and Al-Qaeda provided by Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi after he was rendered to
Egypt and tortured. See GEORGE TENET, AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM: MY YEARS AT THE
CIA 353-54 (2007) ("We believed that al-Libi was withholding critical threat information at
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And how do we come by information like that? Well, we coerce it out
of the government. We file habeas corpus petitions in the federal courts and
compel the government to justify the legality of their detentions. For centuries, the executive's legal duty when confronted with a habeas petition is to
file what is called a "factual return," setting forth the legal and factual bases
for the detention. The prisoner who has brought the petition is then entitled
to traverse--or deny the allegations in-the return and to demand that the
government provide discovery in support of its allegations. 26
The whole habeas process is an information-gathering machine, which
over the centuries has worked to assure that the executive branch cannot do
its work in secret. By flushing information into the public sphere, habeas
corpus thus provides the public with an opportunity to review the motives,
actions, and effectiveness of their leaders so that they can replace "regimes"
when appropriate. Our working theory in a democracy is that the political
process can solve most of our problems. So if you do not like torture, vote
for a President who will refuse to have his subordinates torture people and
who will not test the limits of executive authority.
Habeas corpus, I am arguing, is a democracy-enhancing device that
works by operation of law to coerce the government to reveal information
that it wants to keep secret. The habeas lawyer, I therefore suggest modestly, is the legal mirror-image of the state as torturer and as outlaw information-gatherer.
In sum, unless we face the fact that there is, even for liberals, a persuasive argument in favor of torture as an information-forcing device, we will
be at a loss to devise an appropriate response. We cannot simply state that
torture is immoral, period-at least not so long as we have to play the "ticking time bomb" game. Rather, an effective answer has to be one in which
actual information about the inefficacy of torture is gathered and broadcast
to the public. And that is what habeas corpus is all about.

the time, so we transferred him to a third country for further debriefing. Allegations were
made that we did so knowing that he would be tortured, but this is false. The country in
question understood and agreed that they would hold al-Libi for a limited period.").
26. The history of the "return" requirement and its information-forcing purpose is
described in Marc D. Falkoff, Back to Basics: Habeas Corpus Procedures and Long-Term
Executive Detention, 86 DENVER U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript on file with the
NorthernIllinois University Law Review).

